Labor & Employment Law

[09/03] Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc.
In a sexual harassment case in which a male employee was the victim of a female co-worker, summary judgment for defendant is reversed where there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether: 1) plaintiff was subjected to "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature"; 2) such conduct was unwelcome; 3) the pervasiveness and the inadequate response by the employer established a jury question of whether a co-worker's overtures led to an abusive environment; 4) defendant's actions were not enough to establish an affirmative defense.

[09/03] Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc.
In plaintiff's suit against her former employer under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, district court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment is affirmed where: 1) plaintiff has offered insufficient evidence to establish the key elements of her retaliation and discrimination claims; and 2) district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment.

[09/03] Brooks v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.
In plaintiff's suit against Union Pacific Railroad Company under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), to recover damages for back injuries that he allegedly suffered while working as a machinist at defendant's locomotive repair shop, district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant is affirmed where: 1) plaintiff has failed to establish causation, negligence or foreseeability; and 2) the district court properly excluded plaintiff's medical expert's causation opinion for failure to comply with Rule 26(a)(2).

[09/03] Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc.
In plaintiff's suit against his former employer claiming discrimination because of his race and retaliation under Title VII, jury's verdict for plaintiff on a retaliation claim is reversed and remanded as the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to find an actual or constructive discharge.

[09/03] Songer v. Dillon Resources, Inc.
In an action brought by truck drivers who operate commercial trucks against defendants for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), summary judgment for defendants and dismissal of plaintiffs' claims with prejudice is affirmed where the Motor Carrier Act exemption applies to bar plaintiffs' claims as: 1) the MCA applies to defendant-staff leasing agency because is a joint employer with the two companies, both of whom are subject to the exemption, and 2) plaintiffs engaged in activities that directly affect operational safety of motor vehicles in transport of property in interstate commerce.

[09/02] Weber v.Universities Research Ass'n, Inc.
In plaintiff's suit against her former employer for sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant is affirmed where: 1) plaintiff has waived her discrimination and retaliation arguments under the direct method of proof; and 2) plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, because even if she does not have to show that she was meeting defendant's legitimate business expectations, defendant is still entitled to summary judgment as she has failed to show that there were similarly situated men who were treated more favorably than she was.

[09/02] Branham v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc.
In plaintiff's suit under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) against her former employer for being terminated from her job as a receptionist, district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer is reversed and remanded where: 1) the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to defendant based on the submission of negative medical certification indicating that plaintiff could return to work; 2) plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact about her entitlement to FMLA leave, and defendant was not permitted to deny her leave based on the certification requirement when it never properly requested certification or informed her of the consequences of failing to provide the same, as required by Department of Labor regulations.

[09/01] Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Serv., Inc.
In consolidated Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) actions claiming that during plaintiffs' employment they worked more than forty hours per week and defendant employers failed to pay them either a federally mandated minimum wage, federally mandated overtime pay, or both, summary judgment for defendants is reversed where: 1) if a district court, ruling for a defendant, applied the "coming to rest" doctrine -- for instance, by looking at where defendant bought an item instead of where an item was produced, the court must vacate the judgment for the defendant if there was a question about where the "goods" or "materials" were produced or where they moved; and 2) for the purposes of the FLSA's handling clause, an item will count as "materials" if it accords with the definition of "materials" -- tools or other articles necessary for doing or making something -- in the context of its use and if the employer has employees "handling, selling, or otherwise working on" the item for the employer's commercial (not just any) purposes.

[09/01] Morse v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.
In plaintiff's action claiming that the Transportation Security Administration violated his veterans' preference rights when it declined to waive its maximum entry age requirement in connection with his application for employment as a Federal Air Marshal, the Merit Systems Protection Board's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed as the TSA is exempt from section 3330(a) of Title 5, which provides Board appeal rights for preference eligible veterans.

[09/01] Smith v. Selma Cmty. Hosp.
In plaintiff's successful suit against a hospital to have his hospital privileges reinstated, trial court's denial of his motion for attorney fees is reversed and remanded where: 1) when the conditions contained in section 809.9 are shown, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees; 2) the statutory phrase "frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith," set forth separate grounds for an award of attorney fees; 3) the terms "frivolous," "unreasonable" and "without foundation" are objective standards that might overlap; 4) the term "bad faith" is a subjective standard concerned with a defendant's motives for defending or litigating a lawsuit; and 5) because a defendant's subjective state of mind is usually proven by circumstantial evidence, a defendant's prelitigaton conduct and postlitigation conduct are relevant evidence from which inferences can be drawn regarding its motives in defending or litigating a lawsuit.

[09/01] Sprinkles v. Associated Indem. Corp.
In plaintiffs' bad faith action against Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, arising from an underlying suit against defendant and his employer for causing the death of plaintiffs' father in an automobile accident, trial court's judgment sustaining the insurer's demurrer is affirmed as, under the complaint and matters judicially noticed, the defendant-employee was an insured, rendering the automobile exclusion in the GCL policy applicable, and Fireman's Fund had no duty to defend the employer.

[08/31] Franklin v. Kellogg Co.
In plaintiff's suit against Kellogg Company on behalf of herself and all similarly situated employees to recover wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for time spent donning and doffing Kellogg's mandatory food safety uniforms and protective equipment, and for time spent walking to and from the changing area and the time clock, district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kellogg is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded where: 1) section 203 is not an exemption and therefore not an affirmative defense; 2) the items at issue are clothes within the meaning of section 203(o); 3) the evidence demonstrates that there was a custom or practice of nonpayment for time spent changing clothes under a bona fide CBA, and as such, time spent donning and doffing the equipment is excluded from "hours worked" under section 203(o); 4) under the continuous workday rule, plaintiff may be entitled to payment for her post-donning and pre-donning walking time, and as such, the matter is remanded because there are questions of fact as to the length of time it took her to walk from the changing area to the time clock and whether that time was de minimis.

[08/31] Cent. States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. O'Neil Bros. Transfer & Storage Co.
In a multi-employer pension fund administrator's suit against an employer seeking interim payment of withdrawal liability under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, district court's grant of summary judgment for administrator is affirmed as defendant's default is governed by the provisions of 29 U.S.C. section 1399(c)(5)(B), and under that section, as interpreted reasonably by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the entire amount of the withdrawal payment is immediately payable upon default and that obligation is not deferred because of the pendency of arbitration.

[08/31] Jones v. Astrue
In plaintiff's appeal from the district court's judgment upholding the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, the order is affirmed where: 1) the ALJ had no need to contact plaintiff's treating physician because there was no ambiguity to resolve in her report, and the report contained all the necessary information, including the results of diagnostic testing; 2) the ALJ appropriately considered plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain under Polaski; and 3) substantial evidence on the record as a whole supported the ALJ's decision.

[08/31] Colenburg v. STARCON Int'l, Inc.
In an action for race-based employment discrimination, reprisal, and hostile work environment under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), summary judgment for defendant is affirmed where: 1) plaintiff lacked evidence suggesting that defendant's decision to promote plaintiff's white coworker was based upon race; and 2) plaintiff could show no other non-class members that were not fired for doing the same things, and thus his claim was required to fail at the outset.

Back to Main Menu